MEDIA AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
EYTAN GILBOA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Successive evolutions in communication technologies have significantly
altered the conduct of conflict, warfare, and conflict resolution. Compared to
people of earlier ages, people around the world today know much more and
much sooner about major developments in international relations. Global
news networks that broadcast live from all corners of the world and via the
Internet provide immediate access to unfolding events and, under certain
conditions, could influence the way those events develop and end. Evolutions
in communication technologies have changed the meaning of power in
international relations, the number and nature of actors participating in
international political processes, and the strategies these actors employ to
achieve their goals. Governments have lost much of their monopoly on
information, and non-state actors and individuals have become much more
active and significant participants in world affairs, both in warfare and
conflict resolution. State and non-state actors are increasingly employing
―soft power,‖ or ―smart power,‖ which integrates soft and hard power, and
public diplomacy, which translates soft power assets into concrete actions.1
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1. Soft power is the capability to get actors to do what you want via attraction and persuasion,
while hard power is the capability to achieve the same goals via military force and economic means,
including sanctions, aid, and bribes. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN
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Successful utilization of soft power and public diplomacy depends to a large
extent on global communication.
Despite the critical significance of the roles played by media in conflict
and conflict resolution, this area has been relatively neglected by both
scholars and practitioners. Most existing studies focus on the often negative
contributions of the media to the escalation and violence phases of conflict.2
Very few studies deal with the actual or potential media contributions to
conflict resolution and reconciliation.3 Indeed, the media, particularly radio
and television, were instrumental in fomenting conflict and violence in places
such as Rwanda and Bosnia.4 The Danish cartoon controversy also
demonstrates that the media can even cause a violent conflict.5 Scholars and
practitioners have noticed how the media exacerbate conflict and have
concluded that the media’s role can be reversed and converted into positive
contributions to conflict resolution.6 This reversal, however, is difficult to
achieve. It is always easier to foment conflict than resolve it, and the media’s
role in conflict resolution is more complicated than the roles of those
dominating the violence phase.
The paucity of research and analysis of the media’s role in conflict
resolution may be attributed to the difficulties inherent in multidisciplinary

WORLD POLITICS, at x, 5–6 (2004); THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 33–35 (Jan Melissen ed., 2005); Ernest J. Wilson III, Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart
Power, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 110, 114–15 (2008). See generally ALI FISHER &
AURÉLIE BRÖCKERHOFF, OPTIONS FOR INFLUENCE: GLOBAL CAMPAIGNS OF PERSUASION IN THE
NEW WORLDS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (2008); MARK LEONARD ET AL., PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (2002);
Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 31 (2008); Eytan Gilboa, Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, 616 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 55 (2008) (discussing the basic workings of public diplomacy).
2. See, e.g., MICK HUME, WHOSE WAR IS IT ANYWAY? THE DANGERS OF THE JOURNALISM OF
ATTACHMENT (1997).
3. See, e.g., Eytan Gilboa, Media and Conflict Resolution, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 455–74 (Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk & I. William Zartman eds.,
2009) [hereinafter Gilboa, Media and Conflict Resolution]; Eytan Gilboa, Media and International
Conflict, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT COMMUNICATION: INTEGRATING THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 595–620 (John G. Oetzel & Stella Ting-Toomey eds., 2006).
4. See DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, JUSTICE ON THE GRASS: A STORY OF GENOCIDE AND
REDEMPTION 1–11 (2005); Phyllis E. Bernard, Eliminationist Discourse in a Conflicted Society:
Lessons for America from Africa?, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 191–200 (2009); Ahmed Buric, The
Media War and Peace in Bosnia, in REGIONAL MEDIA IN CONFLICT: CASE STUDIES IN LOCAL WAR
REPORTING 64–99 (Alan Davis ed., 2001); Lynn M. Malley, Observations from an American Conflict
Resolution Professional in Serbia on the Effects of the Accessibility of International Media, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 241, 245 (2009).
5. See generally Bent Nørby Bonde, How 12 Cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed Were
Brought to Trigger an International Conflict, 28 NORDICOM REV. 33 (2007); Shawn Powers,
Examining the Danish Cartoon Affair: Mediatized Cross-Cultural Tensions?, 1 MEDIA, WAR &
CONFLICT 339–59 (2008).
6. See Gilboa, Media and Conflict Resolution, supra note 3, at 461–66.
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research and the absence of adequate tools, models, and frameworks for
analysis. There are serious gaps between theoreticians and practitioners in the
fields of conflict resolution, communication, and journalism. Gaps also exist
between theoreticians and practitioners within each of these groups. One way
to reduce these gaps is to construct a multidisciplinary framework for analysis
and practice. This study attempts to offer such a framework.
This work is based on a unique multidisciplinary integration of normative
and empirical theories and approaches from several fields: international
relations, conflict studies, communication, and journalism. While the field of
international relations places contemporary conflict in a proper historical and
theoretical context, the discipline of conflict studies provides concepts and
analysis of information related to the nature and process of conflict resolution
and reconciliation. Communication studies give meaning to the evolutions in
communication technologies and media functions. Finally, the field of
journalism provides insight into the roles of journalists in society and conflict
resolution.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II explores contemporary
international conflicts and suggests significant distinctions between levels,
types, and phases of conflict. Part III suggests distinctions between types of
media, types of journalism, levels of media, and media functions and
dysfunctions.
Part IV integrates the different components into one
multidimensional and multidisciplinary framework for analysis and suggests
how it may be utilized for both theory and practice. Part V concludes.
II. CONFLICT
A. Levels
Contemporary violent conflicts tend to occur within, rather than between,
states.7 Even during the Cold War, protracted limited violence—exemplified
primarily in terrorism and guerilla warfare, as opposed to large-scale
conventional war—dominated international relations.8 Figure 1 shows that at
the beginning of the Cold War, the number of internal violent conflicts was
higher than the number of interstate conflicts, but that the gap between the
two types was small. Since the mid-1950s, the gap has considerably widened.
Following the end of the Cold War, the number of violent internal conflicts
went up sharply and new conflicts emerged at the global level.
7. See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 20–21, 25, 192 (1991).
―Interstate conflicts‖ occur between and among sovereign states while ―internal conflicts‖ occur
between and among groups or organizations within a state, such as ethnic and religious groups.
―Low intensity conflicts‖ occur between and among states, but also between and among groups or
organizations within states.
8. MICHAEL S. NEIBERG, WARFARE IN WORLD HISTORY 93–97 (2001).
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Figure 1: Global Trends in Violent Conflict, 1950–20059

Ethnic and civil wars erupted in Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and
Africa, in places such as Rwanda, Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, and
Liberia. Further, the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington by Islamic fundamentalists, and similar subsequent attacks in
Great Britain, Spain, Kenya, Indonesia, Bali, Turkey, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia,
and Egypt, as well as the United States-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
represent conflict at the global level.10 The ―clash of civilizations‖ theory
debates the economic and social consequences of globalization and deals with
conflict at the global level.11

9. J. Joseph Hewitt, Trends in Global Conflict 1946–2005, in PEACE AND CONFLICT 2008, at 21
(J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 2008).
10. See Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (providing
information on more than 80,000 terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2007) (last
visited Nov. 19, 2009).
11. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 23, 219 (1995); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,
THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 419–25 (2005); SAMUEL
P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 68 (1996);
JOSEPH S. NYE JR., POWER IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE: FROM REALISM TO GLOBALIZATION
194 (2004).
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B. Types
The nature and evolution of contemporary conflicts have generated
analytical distinctions between different kinds and levels of violence.
Scholars distinguish High Intensity Conflict (HIC), where violence is
primarily characterized by interstate wars,12 from Low Intensity Conflict
(LIC), where violence is much more limited and is pursued by irregular forces
against regular armies.13 Scholars have characterized the violence of LIC as a
―small war‖14 or ―fourth-generation wars.‖15 In his book, Strategy: The Logic
of War and Peace, Edward N. Luttwak coined a postmodern term—
―post-heroic war‖—to describe the essence of LIC.16 These terms suggest
that conflict and warfare today are very different from those of previous eras.
In the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Defense defined LIC as:
political-military confrontation between contending states or
groups below conventional war and above the routine,
peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves
protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies.
Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of
armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means,
employing political, economic, informational, and military
instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized,
generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global
security implications.17
12. STEPHEN D. BIDDLE, MILITARY POWER: EXPLAINING VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN MODERN
BATTLE 6 (2004).
13. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: THE PATTERN OF WARFARE IN THE MODERN WORLD 2–5
(Loren B. Thompson ed., 1989).
14. Harry G. Summers Jr., A War is a War is a War is a War, in LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT,
supra note 13, at 45–48.
15. Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, 214
STRATEGIC FORUM 1, 1 (2005). First-generation warfare started after the Treaty of Westphalia
(1648), and refers to battles fought by states using line-and-column tactics with uniformed soldiers.
William S. Lind, Understanding Fourth Generation War, 84 MIL. REV. 12, 12 (2004).
Second-generation warfare began in the mid-1800s following the invention of new weapons,
including breech-loading weapons, machine guns, and indirect artillery. Id. Third-generation
warfare began with the German blitzkrieg, which introduced the elements of speed and surprise and
was used to bypass enemy lines and collapse the enemy’s forces from the rear. Id. at 13. Fourthgeneration warfare is conflict characterized by battles between state and non-state actors and the
blurring of the lines between war and politics, and soldier and civilian. Id. at 13, 16.
16. EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, STRATEGY: THE LOGIC OF WAR AND PEACE 68–80 (rev. &
enlarged ed. 2001).
17. Janine Davidson, Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution and
Debate 1, 8 & n.18 (Brookings Inst., Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series No. 1, 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0608_counterinsurgency_davidson/0608_
counterinsurgency_davidson.pdf (noting that the U.S. Department of Defense has since replaced this
definition in its U.S. Army field manuals with definitions more focused on modern
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LIC is usually asymmetrical, especially when one side is a state
employing armed forces and obeying the laws and rules of war while the other
side is an organization or a group employing irregular forces, exploiting the
weaknesses of liberal democracies, and systematically violating the laws and
rules of war.18 These characteristics suggest that the goals of parties engaged
in LIC are more political than military.19 The main strategy is to wear out the
other side, and the results on the ground are less important because victory is
defined in terms of perceptual changes leading to acceptance of demands.20
Usually, non-state actors select this mode of conflict because it best serves
their causes.21 LIC is long, very difficult to resolve, and requires effective
conflict management which, at most, may reduce the level of violence. LIC
persists with periods of ceasefire in between waves of violence. The
distinction between home and front, and soldiers and citizens, is blurred.22
Often, in clear violation of international law and norms, a violent organization
deliberately attacks members of the other side and uses its own members as
human shields.23
A conflict in a particular region may transform across time from one type
of conflict to another.
For example, in 2003 the U.S. fought a
full-scale war in Iraq, but since then the U.S. has been engaged in LIC. The
purpose of the first stage, HIC, was to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein.
The main purpose of the second stage, LIC, was to replace Saddam Hussein’s
authoritarian regime with democracy. The second LIC stage consisted of two
interrelated types of violence: a civil war between the Sunni, the previous
minority ruling sect, and the Shia, the new ruling sect; and a war between
several opposition forces, primarily the Sunni, and the U.S. forces. The two
types of warfare are very different and present different challenges for
policy makers and the media.
Given the different characteristics of the two types of conflict, their
resolution requires different approaches. Protracted violence of the kind that
existed in the Balkans, Iraq, Sudan, and Israel and Palestine has been
exacerbated by many complex historical, religious, and cultural elements.
International and intrastate religious and cultural conflicts are much more
difficult to resolve than territorial interstate conflicts. In several recent cases,
such as the Balkans, only foreign military intervention stopped the violence
counterinsurgency tactics) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. See LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 3–4.
19. Id. at 4.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Investigator Presents Report on Gaza War, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/middleeast/30gaza.html.
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and created favorable conditions for effective conflict resolution. Media
coverage of LICs is extremely crucial because the main goal of the sides
engaged in this type of conflict is to alter the enemy’s perception.24
C. Phases
International conflict is a dynamic process that moves through several
distinct phases or stages. Scholars and practitioners have identified life cycles
of conflicts and analyzed them in chronological terms.25 Many scholars and
practitioners have distinguished three basic phases: pre-conflict, conflict, and
post-conflict,26 or pre-violence, violence, and post-violence.27
These
approaches are not very useful because they focus on ―conflict‖ or ―violence‖
and treat the other phases as merely insignificant stages that chronologically
come before or after conflict or violence. A more useful approach would
consider the pre- and post- phases as equally important, and would attempt to
fill them with adequate and relevant content. This Article suggests
distinguishing four stages of international conflict based on different critical
conditions and principal intervention goals: (1) onset-prevention, (2)
escalation-management, (3) de-escalation-resolution, and (4) terminationreconciliation. Each phase has distinct characteristics and specific outcomes.
The first stage, onset-prevention, is characterized by the surfacing of
conflict, the beginning of disagreements, and growth in hostile verbal and
behavioral exchanges. At this stage, only effective prevention measures can
stop the conflict from deteriorating into violence.28 If prevention succeeds,
the conflict is peacefully settled and the conflict process temporarily or
permanently terminates. If not, parties may escalate the conflict believing
they can impose a solution via violence. Uses of force include full-scale war,
military intervention, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, firing across borders, and
deployment of forces. Conflict management—limiting and halting violence to
relatively tolerable levels—applies to the escalation phase, which typically

24. See Hammes, supra note 15, at 1–2.
25. See, e.g., JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT,
DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION 81–87 (1996); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE:
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES 12–15 (1995); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, THE
MORAL IMAGINATION: THE ART AND SOUL OF BUILDING PEACE 41–49 (2005) [hereinafter
LEDERACH, MORAL IMAGINATION]; MICHAEL S. LUND, PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICTS: A
STRATEGY FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 37–44 (1996).
26. ROSS HOWARD, AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEDIA AND PEACEBUILDING 6–8
(2002); Christoph Spurk, Media and Peacebuilding: Concepts, Actors and Challenges 7–10 (Ctr. for
Peacebuilding (KOFF), Paper No. 1, 2002).
27. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact
on Conflict Management Is Invisible and Indirect, 37 J. PEACE RES. 131, 132 (2000).
28. See Alice Ackermann, The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention, 40 J. PEACE RES. 339,
341–42 (2003).
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ends in a formal or informal ceasefire or an armistice.
The post-conflict period should be further subdivided into two separate
phases: (1) resolution and (2) reconciliation. The difference between the two
stems from the significant distinction sociologist Johan Galtung made
between ―negative peace‖ and ―positive peace‖ in his pioneering article,
Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.29 Negative peace refers only to the
absence of violence,30 whereas positive peace refers to the building of new
relations in many relevant areas between former enemies, including open
borders, trade, tourism, and cultural ties.31 Positive peace is equivalent to
what international relations scholar Kenneth Boulding called ―stable peace.‖32
Stable peace is ―a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it
does not really enter the calculations of any of the people involved.‖33 Other
scholars have made a similar distinction between ―conflict resolution‖ and
conflict ―transformation.‖34 According to scholar John P. Lederach, conflict
transformation usually involves transforming perceptions of issues, actions,
and other people or groups, and it takes place both at the personal and the
systemic level.35
In the resolution phase, leaders attempt to negotiate an agreement to end
violence. If leaders reach a formal agreement, they may end violence and
facilitate transformation. If leaders do not reach a formal agreement, they
may resume violence or create a stalemate. International relations scholars
had believed that positive or stable peace could be achieved and maintained
via security and economic and political cooperation.36 More recently,
however, they have become aware of the need to also examine psychological
dimensions of this phase.37
The reconciliation phase goes beyond conflict resolution and peace
agreements, and addresses psychological and cognitive barriers to stable

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167, 183 (1969).
Id. at 189–90 n.31.
See id.
KENNETH BOULDING, STABLE PEACE 13 (1978).
Id.
JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED
SOCIETIES 24–25, 73–85 (1997) [hereinafter LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE]; Hugh Miall, Conflict
Transformation Theory and European Practice 3 (Sep. 12–15, 2007) (unpublished paper prepared for
the Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations, ECPR Standing Group on
International
Relations,
in
Turin,
Italy),
available
at
http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Miall-conflict_transformation_theory_and_european_practice.pdf.
35. LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE, supra note 34, at 75.
36. See generally STABLE PEACE AMONG NATIONS (Arie M. Kacowicz et al. eds., 2000).
37. Fen Osler Hampson, Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner? The Role of Third
Parties in Ending Violent Conlict, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 388, 395–97 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001).
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peace.38 Reconciliation moves from formal peace agreements to ―changing
the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the great majority of
the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship
between the parties, and the parties themselves.‖39 Reconciliation is both a
process and an outcome.40 The outcome is friendship and harmony between
former enemies.
The distinction between resolution and transformation of conflict41 is
based on the assumption that even if the opposing sides reach a peace
agreement, it is only an agreement between leaders, not between peoples, and
it has to be fully implemented and respected over time. Therefore, the
distinction between the third phase, conflict resolution, and the fourth phase,
reconciliation, is that during reconciliation the parties attempt to move from
negative peace to positive peace, or from conflict resolution to conflict
transformation. The parties try to fully engage their respective peoples and
transform relations from hostility to amicability. Scholar Raimo Väyrynen
raised questions about the meaning of transformation and placed the concept
in a different context.42 For Väyrynen, transformation meant a major change
in a principal element of a conflict that includes actors, issues, and rules, and
therefore, it may occur at any phase.43 Väyrynen argued that transformation
must happen before resolution becomes possible.44
Given Väyrynen’s approach and the different meanings applied to
transformation, other concepts have had to be identified and used in
connection with positive peace. The options are ―peacebuilding‖ and
38. See Herbert C. Kelman, Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological
Perspective, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 111–24 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov
ed., 2004). See generally AFTER THE PEACE: RESISTANCE AND RECONCILIATION (Robert L.
Rothstein ed., 1999) [hereinafter AFTER THE PEACE]; FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION:
RELIGION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (Raymond G. Helmick & Rodney L.
Petersen eds., 2001); ROADS TO RECONCILIATION: CONFLICT AND DIALOGUE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (Amy Benson Brown & Karen M. Poremski eds., 2005).
39. Daniel Bar-Tal & Gemma H. Bennink, The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as
a Process, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION, supra note 38, at 11, 12.
40. See Alice Ackermann, Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process in Postwar Europe: The
Franco-German Case, 19 PEACE & CHANGE 229, 229–30 (1994) [hereinafter Ackermann,
Reconciliation]. See also Herbert C. Kelman, Transforming the Relationship Between Former
Enemies: A Social-Psychological Analysis, in AFTER THE PEACE, supra note 38, at 193–205; Graham
Kemp, The Concept of Peaceful Societies, in KEEPING THE PEACE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
PEACEFUL SOCIETIES AROUND THE WORLD 1–10 (Graham Kemp & Douglas P. Fry eds., 2004).
41. Several scholars have suggested that transformation of conflict is a ―process,‖ but have
defined ―reconciliation‖ as an outcome. Others, however, have viewed reconciliation as both a
process and an outcome.
42. Raimo Väyrynen, From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Transformation: A Critical Review,
in THE NEW AGENDA FOR PEACE RESEARCH 135–160 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 1999).
43. Id. at 151.
44. See id. at 150–51.
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―reconciliation.‖45 Several scholars have equated the two,46 but others have
used peacebuilding as a general concept that applies to all the phases
and levels of conflict.47
This work suggests that the term
―termination-reconciliation‖ best captures the essence of the fourth phase.
Figure 2: Phases of Conflict

Stage/Phase

Revised
Stage/
Phase

Outcome

Pre-Conflict

Conflict

Post-Conflict

Onset

Escalation

De-escalation

Termination

Prevention

Management

Resolution

Reconciliation

Violence

Ceasefire
Peace

Negative
Peace

Positive
Peace

Figure 2 describes the four suggested phases of conflict by stage/phase,
revised stage/phase, and outcome. Each phase may end in outcomes different
from those listed in Figure 2. For example, if prevention succeeds, the
conflict does not become violent; if conflict resolution fails, the parties cannot
sign a peace agreement. The listed outcomes typically occur when a conflict
moves from one phase to the next, but an international conflict may not move
linearly from one phase to another. A conflict may erratically move forward
and backward, for example, from management to resolution and back to
management. Phases of international conflict are often fluid. Events and
processes, such as uses of force, negotiation, and mediation, may appear at
45. See, e.g, ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 38
(2004); Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding: Conceptual and Policy Issues, in APPROACHES TO
PEACEBUILDING 3–5 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 2002); Ackermann, Reconciliation, supra note 40, at 230.
46. Compare Ackermann, Reconciliation, supra note 40, at 230 (defining reconciliation as ―a
process by which countries can establish structures and procedures for establishing durable peace‖)
with PARIS, supra note 45, at 38 (defining peacebuilding as ―action undertaken at the end of a civil
conflict to consolidate peace‖).
47. See Spurk, supra note 26, at 1; LEDERACH, MORAL IMAGINATION, supra note 25, at 5;
HOWARD, supra note 26, at 5.
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more than one phase. Even when parties seek resolution through negotiation,
they may still use force to improve their bargaining power. Failure to reach
an agreement may motivate parties to renew hostilities. Thus, force may be
used in both the management and resolution phases. While the purpose of
using force in the management phase is to impose a solution, the purpose of
using force in the resolution phase is to affect negotiations. Uses of force in
the two phases also differ; force is more massive and sustained in the
management phase, but more sporadic and limited in the resolution phase.
Similarly, negotiation and mediation occur during both prevention and
resolution. In the prevention phase, the purpose of negotiation is to peacefully
deal with the sources of conflict to prevent violence, while in the resolution
phase, the purpose is to negotiate a peace agreement following the eruption of
violence. Conflict resolution after war can be both easier and more
complicated. Conflict resolution can be easier because parties may be ready
to make concessions that they rejected prior to the violent phase. However,
conflict resolution can be more complicated because neither side can move
beyond its negative feelings over its incurred cost of violence in terms of
human and material resources.
III. MEDIA
A. Type I: Traditional vs. New Media
Any analysis of media roles in conflict resolution must address both the
traditional media (newspapers, television, and radio) and the new media
(Internet). Evolutions in communication technologies have created global
news networks and various online social networks.48 Global news networks
can broadcast live from almost any place in the world to any other place.
Commentators and scholars invented the term ―CNN effect‖ to describe how
dominant global television coverage has become in world affairs, especially in
acute international conflicts.49 The term implies that television coverage
forces policy makers to take actions they otherwise would not have taken.50
Thus, the media determine the national interest and usurp policy making from
elected and appointed officials.51
The Internet provides many non-state actors with access to people around
the world and, consequently, with endless opportunities to exchange and

48. TERRY FLEW, NEW MEDIA: AN INTRODUCTION 102–03, 188–89 (2002).
49. PIERS ROBINSON, THE CNN EFFECT: THE MYTH OF NEWS, FOREIGN POLICY AND
INTERVENTION 2 (2002); Eytan Gilboa, The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of
International Relations, 22 POL. COMM. 27, 28 (2005).
50. ROBINSON, supra note 49, at 2.
51. Id.
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debate events and processes both inside and outside political entities.52 Nonstate actors include non-governmental organizations, international agencies,
alliances, multinational firms, terrorist organizations, criminal organizations,
global news networks, and even individuals. The Internet provides people
with access to news from a variety of sources, up-to-the-minute information
on events and processes, and different points of view.53 It also allows
unprecedented interactivity, from simple talk back to blogs and placement of
text, picture, and video on rapidly growing social networks such as Twitter,
YouTube, Facebook, and MySpace.54
Moreover, cell phones allow people to send e-mails, receive information,
and produce photographs and videos. The combination of advanced cell
phones and social networking inspires the emergence of ―citizen journalists‖
who can at any time report events from houses and streets to the entire
world.55 The Internet can penetrate national boundaries of even the most
closed and authoritarian societies.
For instance, the 2009 protest against the outcome of the presidential
elections in Iran demonstrated the new options for communication and
influence available on the Internet. The Iranian government attempted to
block coverage of the large demonstrations in Tehran and other major cities
by imposing harsh restrictions on local and foreign reporters, but the
opposition was able to send reports of the violence inflicted on the
demonstrators via social networks such as YouTube and Twitter.56
Unlike the conventional media, the Internet is almost unlimited in space,
is a very fast mode of communication, allows sophisticated utilization of
multimedia functions and interactivity, reaches large audiences around the
world, is not subject to stiff regulation and control, and is relatively
inexpensive to maintain. In addition, web sites and social networks have
become sources of information for the traditional media as well as for global

52. JAMES F. LARSON, THE INTERNET AND FOREIGN POLICY 48–49 (2004); Juyan Zhang &
Brecken Chinn Swartz, Toward a Model of NGO Media Diplomacy in the Internet Age: Case Study
of Washington Profile, 35 PUB. REL. REV. 47, 47 (2009).
53. Holli A. Semetko, Media and Public Diplomacy in Times of War and Crisis, 52 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 639, 639 (2009).
54. See generally Kari Andén-Papadopoulos, U.S. Soldiers Imaging the Iraq War on YouTube,
7 POPULAR COMM. 17–27 (2009).
55. DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE
PEOPLE, at xix–xxix (rev. ed. 2006); Mark Deuze et al., Preparing for an Age of Participatory News,
1 JOURNALISM PRAC. 322, 322–23 (2007); Stephen D. Reese et al., Mapping the Blogosphere:
Professional and Citizen-Based Media in the Global News Arena, 8 JOURNALISM 235, 239 (2007).
56. See Bernard, supra note 4, at 206–07; Editorial, Iran’s Twitter Revolution, WASH. TIMES,
Jun. 16, 2009, at A20, available at www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/16/irans-twitterrevolution.
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news networks.57 Live reporting is no longer the exclusive domain of
networks such as CNN and BBC World News. At the same time, however, it
is very difficult to verify the authenticity and accuracy of Internet reports,
including visual materials.58 Audiences may not know who, when, where, and
under what circumstances a particular photo or video clip was taken. Without
regulation, ethical standards, or professional supervision, any individual
posting materials can fabricate events or rewrite them. This is particularly
true for conflicts in which each side presents its own narrative and grievances.
The Internet provides many advantages to state and non-state actors,
particularly weak and poor actors. Through web sites, states, groups,
movements, organizations, and individuals can directly present themselves
and their positions to the world, and can cultivate hundreds of supporting
virtual communities to help spread their messages. Like a weapon, the
Internet also can be used to attack and discredit hostile forces. Through the
Internet, actors can respond immediately to unfolding events, address
challenges, and exploit advantages.59 Actors that do not employ the Internet
rob themselves of a highly useful tool for engaging in foreign policy and
diplomacy.
B. Type II: Conflict vs. Peace Journalism
Media coverage of international conflict has inspired heated normative
and ethical debates on types of journalism. The most well-known are debates
about ―bystander journalism‖ versus ―journalism of attachment,‖ and
―war/conflict journalism‖ versus ―peace journalism.‖ Martin Bell, in his
work, TV News: How Far Should We Go?, criticized conflict coverage by
distinguishing between ―bystanders’ journalism‖ and ―journalism of
attachment.‖60 He criticized media neutrality and explained that bystanders’
journalism concerns itself more with the circumstances of violence such as
military formations, weapons, strategies, maneuvers, and tactics, while
journalism of attachment concerns itself more with people—those who
provoke wars, those who fight them, and those who suffer from them.61 Bell
argued that journalism of attachment ―cares as well as knows; . . . is aware of
its responsibilities; and will not stand neutral between good and evil, right and

57. See Deuze, supra note 55, at 324–25.
58. See id. at 324.
59. See Nojin Kwak et al., Honey, I Shrunk the World! The Relation Between Internet Use and
International Engagement, 9 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 189, 191 (2006).
60. Martin Bell, TV News: How Far Should We Go?, 8 BRIT. JOURNALISM REV. 7, 8 (1997).
See also Nel Ruigrok, Journalism of Attachment and Objectivity: Dutch Journalists and the Bosnian
War, 1 MEDIA, WAR & CONFLICT 293 (2008).
61. Bell, supra note 60, at 8.
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wrong, the victim and the oppressor.‖62 Bell’s colleagues in Bosnia,
Christiane Amanpour and Ed Vulliamy, adopted a similar approach.63
Amanpour argued that journalists can be objective by giving all sides a fair
hearing, but they do not have to be neutral and treat all sides equally.64
In the Balkan Wars, however, Amanpour and Vulliamy supported the
Muslims and vehemently advocated military intervention against the Serbs.65
A similar pattern surfaced in other conflicts, such as the Palestinian–Israeli
conflict, in which Western journalists perceived the Palestinians as victims
and sided with them.66 News organizations, editors, and reporters often
ignore the media campaigns on behalf of a particular side in an international
conflict because such campaigns violate standards of fair, balanced, and
objective coverage. The Bosnia coverage, however, inspired a needed debate
on journalism of attachment among journalists and scholars.67 For instance,
David Binder of the New York Times called Bell’s argument against neutrality
in warfare ―a garbage argument,‖ and insisted that ―[o]ur job is to report from
all sides, not to play favorites.‖68 Further, Mick Hume argued that journalism
of attachment threatens good journalism because it neglects historical and
political contexts of violence and causes journalists to set themselves up as
judge and jury.69 Stephen Ward thought that Bell’s concept of objectivity was
too narrow and dangerous because journalists may ―devolve into
unsubstantiated journalism where biases parade as moral principles.‖70
BBC World News anchorman Nick Gowing added that the attitude of
Amanpour and her colleagues was neatly exploited by Bosnian ministers who
―usually enjoyed a free ride, their increasingly exaggerated claims accepted as
fact by callow interviewers and anchors in distant studios who did not have
the knowledge or background briefings to know better.‖71 Likewise, Wilhelm
Kempf concluded that journalism of attachment replaced the rules of
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Ed Vulliamy, ―Neutrality‖ and the Absence of Reckoning: A Journalist’s
Account, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 603 (1999).
64. Christiane Amanpour, Television’s Role in Foreign Policy, QUILL, Apr. 1996, at 16, 17.
65. Amanpour, supra note 64, at 16–17; Vulliamy, supra note 63, at 619–20.
66. See, e.g., STEPHANIE GUTMANN, THE OTHER WAR: ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR MEDIA SUPREMACY 3–5 (2005); JIM LEDERMAN, BATTLE LINES: THE AMERICAN
MEDIA AND THE INTIFADA 99, 252 (1992); JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, COVERING THE INTIFADA: HOW
THE MEDIA REPORTED THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING 12–14 (2003).
67. GREG MCLAUGHLIN, THE WAR CORRESPONDENT 153–55, 166–77 (2002).
68. Sherry Ricchiardi, Over the Line?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 1996, at 25, 27 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
69. See HUME, supra note 2, at 4–5.
70. Stephen J. Ward, An Answer to Martin Bell: Objectivity and Attachment in Journalism, 3
HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 121, 124 (1998).
71. NIK GOWING, CARNEGIE COMM’N ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT, CARNEGIE CORP.
OF N.Y., MEDIA COVERAGE: HELP OR HINDRANCE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION? 29 (1997).
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journalism with the rules of propaganda, and that in Bosnia journalists served
their moral impetus by controlling information and fabricating news.72
Further, journalism of attachment is problematic because it deals
predominantly with Western coverage and ignores other types of media, such
as the local media.73 The division of people into categories of ―aggressor‖ or
―victim‖ is highly simplistic because it ignores the possibility that people
ruled by aggressive leaders could also be victims; victims are not only those
being attacked.74 Galtung implied that Bell’s journalism of attachment is not
a good alternative to war journalism because it ignores the wider dimensions
of conflict.75
Galtung and Kempf offered alternatives to war journalism. Galtung
argued that the media generally follow the ―low road‖ of war journalism in
reporting conflict: chasing wars, the elites that run wars, and a ―win-lose‖
outcome.76 His alternative approach, the ―high road‖ of peace journalism,
focuses on conflict transformation, the people who suffer from violence, and a
―win-win‖ solution.77 According to Galtung, war journalism focuses on who
advances and who capitulates, keeping score of the cost in human lives and
material damage.78 This type of coverage polarizes people and escalates
conflict because it calls for hatred and more violence to avenge or stop
―them.‖79 It sees ―them‖ as the problem and dehumanizes ―them.‖80 War
journalism is driven by propaganda and manipulation and is therefore biased
and distorted.81 In contrast, Galtung wrote, peace journalism explores the
reasons behind the violence and provides not only a voice to all parties, but
also empathy and understanding.82 Peace journalism focuses on all suffering
and humanizes all sides.83 Peace journalism is more truthful and attempts to
72. Wilhelm Kempf, Conflict Coverage and Conflict Escalation, in 2 JOURNALISM AND THE
NEW WORLD ORDER: STUDYING WAR AND THE MEDIA 59, 59 (Wilhelm Kempf & Heikki
Luostarinen eds., 2002) [hereinafter Kempf, Conflict Coverage]; Wilhelm Kempf, Escalating and
Deescalating Aspects in the Coverage of the Bosnia Conflict: A Comparative Study, in
2 JOURNALISM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER, supra, at 227, 228–29.
73. See HUME, supra note 2, at 4–5.
74. See id.
75. Johan Galtung, High Road, Low Road: Charting the Course for Peace Journalism,
7 TRACK TWO 7, 7–10 (1998), available at http://www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/7_4/
p07_highroad_lowroad.html.
76. Johan Galtung, Peace Journalism—A Challenge, in 2 JOURNALISM AND THE NEW WORLD
ORDER, supra note 72, at 259, 259–60.
77. Id. at 260.
78. Id. at 259.
79. Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 261 tbl.1.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 260 & 261 tbl.1.
83. Id.
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de-escalate violence by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as
violence.84 While war journalism attaches only to ―our side,‖ peace
journalism is a journalism of attachment to all actual and potential victims.85
Kempf built his approach on Galtung’s ideas, but suggested a more
critical peace journalism, which he called ―de-escalation-oriented conflict
coverage‖ (DEOCC).86 Kempf’s approach questions war and military logic,
and respects and fairly covers the opponent’s rights.87 At the same time,
however, a journalist engaging in DEOCC has to be cautious and self-critical
to avoid dissemination of ―peace propaganda,‖ which is as counterproductive
as ―war propaganda.‖88 DEOCC journalists must maintain a critical distance
from the belligerents and equally and forcefully criticize their actions.89
Several scholars and journalists have criticized peace journalism. Thomas
Hanitzsch, for example, criticized peace journalism and related approaches for
being at odds with mass communication theory.90 Peace journalism is based
on the assumption of ―powerful, causal and linear media effects.‖91
Communication theory, however, has produced very little empirical support
for this approach.92 Peace journalism looks at the audience as an aggregate of
dispersed individuals, but communication theory has identified multiple
audiences with different characteristics.93 Peace journalism assumes that
publishers and journalists, especially at the local media level, can disregard
the interests of their specific audiences; but communication theory suggests
that this assumption is unnatural and economically impossible.94 Peace
journalism places responsibility on the media to prevent, manage, resolve, and

84. Id. at 261 tbl.1.
85. Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Kempf, Conflict Coverage, supra note 72, at 71 fig.7.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 71.
89. Id. at 72.
90. See Thomas Hanitzsch, Journalists as Peacekeeping Force? Peace Journalism and Mass
Communication Theory, 5 JOURNALISM STUD. 483, 484 (2004) [hereinafter Hanitzsch, Peacekeeping
Force]. See also Robert A. Hackett, Is Peace Journalism Possible? Three Frameworks for Assessing
Structure and Agency in News Media, 5 CONFLICT & COMM. ONLINE (2006),
http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2006_2/pdf/hackett.pdf; Thomas Hanitzsch, Situating Peace
Journalism in Journalism Studies: A Critical Appraisal, 6 CONFLICT & COMM. ONLINE (2007),
http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/hanitzsch.pdf; Jake Lynch, Peace Journalism and Its
Discontents,
6
CONFLICT
&
COMM.
ONLINE
(2007),
http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/lynch.pdf; Wilhelm Kempf, Peace Journalism: A
Tightrope Walk Between Advocacy Journalism and Constructive Conflict Coverage, 6 CONFLICT &
COMM. ONLINE (2007), http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2007_2/pdf/kempf.pdf.
91. Hanitzsch, Peacekeeping Force, supra note 90, at 483.
92. Id. at 489–91.
93. Id. at 489.
94. Id. at 489–90.

2009]

MEDIA & CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK

103

transform conflicts, but communication theory does not recognize this role,
and sociological system theory places responsibility for these functions on
political institutions and leaders.95
C. Levels
When analyzing the media’s role in conflict resolution, it is necessary to
distinguish different types and levels of media. Many studies address only the
Western media. However, media is global and can reach audiences
worldwide without national, ethnic, or cultural bias. The hybrid ―glocal‖
refers to media that deal with local or national issues, but are capable of
reaching audiences around the world, such as through the Internet.96 A more
useful approach would distinguish five levels of media by geopolitical
criteria: (1) local, (2) national, (3) regional, (4) international, and (5) global.
Local media include newspapers, television, and radio stations operating
in a town, city, or district. National media include newspapers and electronic
media operating within the boundaries of nation-states. Regional media
operate in a region defined by history, culture, tradition, values, language, or
religion. Examples of regional media include Qatar-based Al Jazeera Arabic
and Dubai-based Al Arabiya, which broadcast primarily to the Middle East,
and the South African Broadcasting Corporation, which serves Africa.
International media include broadcast and print media used or sponsored by
states that operate across international borders. Examples include the Voice
of America, BBC World News, China’s CCTV-9, Al Jazeera International,
France 24, Russia’s Vesti-TV, and Iran’s Press TV. The global media include
privately owned commercial television networks such as CNN International
and print media such as the International Herald Tribune and the Economist.
Both the international and the global media reach audiences worldwide,
but the international media present news and commentary from the
perspective of a particular state, while the global media have no such official
allegiance. In fact, several states such as China, Russia, France, and Iran
established international news networks in English because they were
dissatisfied with coverage of more established global networks such as CNN
International and BBC World News, and have accused those networks of
having a Western bias.97
The global media have more worldwide bureaus and reporters than the
95. Id.
96. Barry Wellman, The Glocal Village: Internet and Community, 1 IDEA&S 26, 29 (2004),
available at http://www.ideasmag.artsci.utoronto.ca/issue1_1/idea_s01-wellman.pdf.
97. See, e.g., Robert Parsons, Russia: New State Channel Goes Global in English, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Sept. 16, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1061443.html; Morning
Edition: Iran’s Press TV to Rival Western Media (NPR radio broadcast July 2, 2007), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11650177.
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international media and cover a much wider variety of global issues, while the
international media tend to cover issues directly relevant to the states which
own them. It is also interesting to note that both CNN and BBC operate two
separate broadcasting systems; CNN International is a global network, while
CNN-US is national, and BBC World News is a global network, while BBCUK is national. The global networks do not broadcast respectively in the U.S.
and the U.K.
There are significant differences in approach and content between each
network’s national, international, and global broadcasts, but very little
research has been conducted to explore how wide the differences are and what
their implications are. Al Jazeera is a unique case because it was established
and is subsidized by the Emir of Qatar. It would be interesting to compare
Al Jazeera’s Arabic broadcasts on the regional channel with its English
broadcasts on the international level.98 It is extremely important to distinguish
between the local and the national media in conflict regions and external
media that operate outside these regions because the local and national media
have a much greater impact on conflict resolution.
D. Functions and Dysfunctions
The functional theory of communication could be very useful for any
attempt to construct a new framework for analysis of media and conflict
resolution. Functional theory is a classic communication theory anchored in
sociological system theory, which views institutions, including the media, as
performing roles designed to meet the needs of individuals and societies.99 In
communication studies, functional theory paved the way for several
approaches and techniques in modern communication research, including
media effects, uses and gratifications, agenda-setting, framing, cultivation
theory, and the spiral of silence theory.100 Scholars have even described
functional theory as a paradigm—a master theory in control of most research
in mass communication.101
Application of functional theory to mass communication developed over
time through several stages. Harold D. Lasswell first suggested three media
functions: (1) surveillance of the environment (news coverage); (2)
correlation of the parts of society (interpretation of news and information,
98. See generally Shawn Powers & Eytan Gilboa, The Public Diplomacy of Al-Jazeera, in NEW
MEDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 53–80 (Phillip Seib ed., 2007).
99. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 121–25 (rev. & enlarged
ed. 1957).
100. STEPHEN W. LITTLEJOHN, THEORIES OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION 14 (6th ed. 1999);
Douglas M. McLeod & Phillip J. Tichenor, The Logic of Social and Behavioral Science, in MASS
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 91, 103–04 (Guido H. Stempel III et al. eds., 2003).
101. DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL’S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 46 (4th ed. 2000).
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commentary, and editorial opinion); and (3) transmission of culture (history,
values, religion, language, etc.).102 Charles R. Wright added a fourth function,
entertainment, distinguished between functions and dysfunctions, and
constructed a framework for functional analysis.103 Denis McQuail added a
fifth function, mobilization, described as ―campaigning for societal objectives
in the sphere of politics, war, economic development, work and sometimes
religion.‖104 Mobilization exists in autocratic societies all the time, in new
nations during the nation-building phase, and in democracies in times of crisis
and warfare. Mobilization may result from a governmental initiative or from
the media’s own initiative.105 After the September 11 terrorist attacks, for
example, the American media self-mobilized and became a significant
collaborating actor in the global war against terrorism. 106 Members of the
media who engage in this type of mobilization are also known as the
―[p]atriotic [p]ress.‖107
Wright’s distinction between functions and dysfunctions is pertinent to
this Article.108 Most approaches to media intervention in international conflict
have ignored unintended consequences, both positive and negative. The
media may provide useful information to citizens who could be motivated to
act against their own interests and the interests of their community. For
example, when the media warn of an approaching tornado, the purpose is not
only to provide information, but also to help citizens prepare for threats to life
and property. A warning, however, could be dysfunctional if it causes panic
and chaos or if everyone rushes to the roads and causes traffic jams.
Similarly, the purpose of reporting on a bank’s financial difficulties is
positive—warning those who have accounts of an imminent threat to their
investments—but the result could be dysfunctional if all customers went to
the bank, liquidated their assets, and drove the bank into bankruptcy.
Application of the Wright formula suggests that, even if the media are
102. Harold D. Lasswell, The Structure and Function of Communication in Society, in THE
COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES 37–51 (Lyman Bryson ed., 1948).
103. Charles R. Wright, Functional Analysis and Mass Communication, 24 PUB. OPINION Q.
605, 609–10 (1960).
104. DENIS MCQUAIL, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 71 (2d ed. 1987).
105. See id. at 146.
106. See W. LANCE BENNETT, REGINA G. LAWRENCE, & STEVEN LIVINGSTON, WHEN THE
PRESS FAILS: POLITICAL POWER AND THE NEWS MEDIA FROM IRAQ TO KATRINA 13–16 (2007);
Douglas Kellner, War Correspondents, the Military, and Propaganda: Some Critical Reflections, 2
INT’L J. COMM. 297, 307–12 (2008).
107. John Hutcheson et al., U.S. National Identity, Political Elites, and a Patriotic Press
Following September 11, 21 POL. COMM. 27–50 (2004); ROBERT ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER:
FRAMING NEWS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1–3 (2004); KATHLEEN HALL
JAMIESON & PAUL WALDMAN, THE PRESS EFFECT: POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, AND THE STORIES
THAT SHAPE THE POLITICAL WORLD 130, 130–31 (2003).
108. See Wright, supra note 103, at 609–10.
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sincerely interested in positive contribution to prevent, manage, resolve, or
reconcile international conflict, the results may backfire. For example, during
the prevention phase, the media may wish to create awareness among the
public for signs of an emerging conflict or violence. The result could be
positive if the warning creates awareness and effective steps are taken to stop
the drift toward violence. However, the result could be negative if the
coverage produces apprehension that leads to escalated conflict behavior. It is
important to educate the public about the sources of conflict and the potential
for violence or conflict resolution. If the public is educated, the coverage
could be functional, but if the public is not educated, the coverage could be
dysfunctional. During the resolution phase, the media may wish to initiate a
conflict resolution process and mobilize public support. If mobilization
occurs, the coverage could be functional. However, if coverage creates
stronger opposition and leads to blocking of the initiative, the result could be
counterproductive and dysfunctional. Similar dysfunctions could occur if the
media attempts to legitimize conflict prevention or conflict resolution, build
confidence, dramatize efforts to reduce violence and begin mediation, create
realistic expectations, or present a positive balance of advantages and
shortcomings of peace agreements.
Several functions and dysfunctions may appear at each of the four conflict
phases, while others may be unique to each phase. In addition, functions and
dysfunctions may vary for each of the five basic media functions. For
instance, entertainment may include implicit or explicit messages that may
either help or hinder efforts to promote peace agreements and
reconciliation.109 In sum, all of the potential functions and dysfunctions are
relevant to the study of media coverage and intervention in conflict resolution.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Figure 3 describes the proposed three-dimensional framework for analysis
and practice. It combines and integrates the various components discussed in
the previous sections. The components were adopted from different yet
relevant fields of science: international relations, conflict studies,
communication, and journalism. The framework’s core is based on a
modified life-cycle theory of conflicts and the functional approach to
communication. The framework demonstrates how research and practice can
be organized to explore positive and negative contributions of the media
through the two types and four phases of conflict, the two types and five
109. See generally MATTHEW A. BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES TO WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE 97–133 (2003).
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levels of media, and the five media functions and dysfunctions.
Figure 3: Media and Conflict Resolution: A Framework for Analysis
Type of Conflict:
Interstate
Conflict Level:
High Intensity Conflict
Type of Media:
Traditional Media
Level of Media:
Local
National

Media
Function:

Prevention

Management

Function Dysfunction Function
News
Interpretation
China/
Tibet

Cultural
Transmission

Dysfunction
Balkans
Election
Violence

Internal
Low Intensity Conflict
New Media
International
Global

Regional

Resolution
Function

Dysfunction
Belgium

Reconciliation
Function

Dysfunction
Peru

Belgium

Entertainment
Mobilization

U.S./
Iraq War

U.S./
Iraq War

The framework is flexible and allows for partial or selective applications.
Researchers do not necessarily need to apply the whole framework to all the
conflict phases. They may choose to investigate all five media functions in
one phase or one function, such as news across all four conflict phases, or
they can focus on one media function in one conflict phase, such as
interpretation in reconciliation. Scholars may also apply the framework to
each of the five levels of media: local, national, regional, international, and
global, or to a particular medium: newspaper, television, radio, or the Internet,
within each category. The framework could be especially useful for case
studies of different kinds.
Studies included in this issue could be classified according to the typology
described in Figure 3. For example, the conflict between the Dutch-speaking
Flemish and the French-speaking Walloons is an internal dispute in Belgium.
The Euwema and Verbeke study explores and compares the news functions
and dysfunctions of the traditional regional media in the management
(escalation) and resolution (de-escalation) phases of conflict.110 For example,
the authors noted the failed attempts by the major daily newspapers in both
regions, Le Soir and De Standaard, to inspire dialogue and understanding
through mutual exchanges of journalists.111 The dysfunction occurred because

110. Martin Euwema & Alain Verbeke, Negative and Positive Roles of Media in the Belgian
Conflict: A Model for De-escalation, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 139 (2009).
111. On the bridging function and performance of journalists, see Eytan Gilboa, Global
Communication and Foreign Policy, 52 J. COMM. 731–748 (2002), and Eytan Gilboa, Media Broker
Diplomacy: When Journalists Become Mediators, 22 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMM. 99–120
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the journalists working and reporting from each other’s regions could not free
themselves from their ethnic biases.
The conflict in Iraq went through two stages; the first was interstate HIC
and the second was internal LIC. The short full-scale war the U.S.-led
coalition conducted in 2003 to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein was
HIC, while the ensuing, protracted civil war and the attacks on the coalition’s
occupying forces represented LIC. The McLeod article examines the
mobilization dysfunction of the traditional national media (the television allnews networks Fox News and CNN-US) in the prevention and management
phases of conflict.112 The study argues that coverage of the Iraq conflict by
the two networks, and perhaps by the entire American media, was
dysfunctional because it failed to investigate and challenge the U.S.
government’s assertions about key elements in the conflict, such as the
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the links between
Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.
The conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s was internal and produced waves
of both HIC and LIC. The Malley contribution offers a personal perspective
both on contemporaneous and historical events.113 She compares coverage by
the local and international media and the traditional and new media in the
management and resolution phases of conflict. Malley argues that the
international media and the new media offered a more neutral and balanced
reporting than the local media. She implies that had the combatants been
exposed to coverage of the first two media types, they would have perceived
the events in a different and more useful way for conflict resolution.
There is a fierce debate about the nature of the conflict over Tibet. From
the Chinese perspective, it is an internal dispute. From the perspective of the
Tibetans, their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and many states, it is an
international dispute. Lee’s study compares coverage of the Tibet conflict in
the international (Western) traditional media and the national traditional
Chinese media in the management phase of conflict.114 He suggests that there
are more similarities than differences in the coverage of the two media
systems.
Violence erupting after elections, primarily in developing countries such
as Iran, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe, represents an internal LIC. The
Meadow study explores coverage of election violence by the national media

(2005).
112. Douglas M. McLeod, Derelict of Duty: The American News Media, Terrorism, and the
War in Iraq, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 113 (2009).
113. Malley, supra note 4.
114. Andrew Wei-Min Lee, Tibet and the Media: Perspectives from Beijing, 93 MARQ. L. REV.
209 (2009).
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in the election states.115 By definition, violence appears in the management
phase of conflict. The study presents the topic and a series of issues for future
research.
Peru suffered from a twenty-year internal armed conflict that began in the
1980s. The violence was clearly typical of LIC. The Laplante and Phenicie
study explores the Peruvian national media’s role during the reconciliation
phase. In this case, reconciliation was designed to prevent any recurrence of
violence and abuses of power.116 The authors conclude that the media role in
this particular case was mostly dysfunctional. Figure 3 shows that most
studies in this issue focus on news, interpretation, and mobilization, and that
the results have been mostly dysfunctional.
V. CONCLUSION
Most contemporary conflicts occur at the interstate or global level, and
this pattern is likely to persist in decades to come. The great majority of
conflicts are of the LIC version, and this pattern is likely to persist in the near
future. The sources of contemporary conflicts include strong cultural and
religious elements, and, therefore, it is difficult to resolve them. This work
argues that evolutions in communication technologies have significantly
altered the media’s role in conflict resolution and reconciliation. Global and
regional news networks and the Internet allow new actors, primarily
non-governmental organizations and individuals, to actively participate in
conflict resolution. New technology has challenged states, but at the same
time provides states with new tools to accomplish their goals. The media’s
role is especially enhanced by the Internet, cell phones, and online social
networks, and is especially relevant to LIC at the local or global level, where
the expected results are perceptual and the main strategy is using violence to
maximize sympathetic and supportive media coverage.
This Article concludes that despite the critical, growing importance of the
media to conflict resolution and reconciliation, scholars and practitioners have
not yet adequately addressed the media’s role in these areas. Particularly
lacking is extensive research on the roles and effects of new media and global
news networks. The main reasons for the weaknesses are difficulties and
deficiencies inherent in multidisciplinary research and the lack of suitable
tools for analysis. This work attempts to fill the gap with a new framework
for analysis based on an innovative integration of theories and models from
several scholarly fields. Multidisciplinary research is the only effective way
to understand the actual and potential positive and negative contributions of
115. Robert G. Meadow, Political Violence and the Media, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 231 (2009).
116. Lisa J. Laplante & Kelly Phenicie, Mediating Post-Conflict Dialogue: The Media’s Role
in Transitional Justice Processes, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (2009).
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the media to conflict resolution and reconciliation.
The media can both help and hinder conflict resolution, and it is important
to uncover the conditions determining the outcome. If these conditions are
exposed, it would be easier to maximize the media’s positive contributions
and minimize negative contributions. The peace journalism approach has
adopted a highly simplistic and probably unrealistic approach to the media’s
effects. Systematic application of the framework proposed in this Article to
case studies at different levels may promote badly needed knowledge and
understanding of the various ways the media influence the beginning,
evolution, and termination of existing and future international conflicts.
The proposed framework is very comprehensive and requires prioritizing
of research projects. Immediate attention should be given to the highly
neglected areas. Thus, the first priority should be to investigate functions and
dysfunctions of the local media because they directly affect people engaged in
conflict and conflict resolution. The next priority should be to focus on the
reconciliation phase. This stage is crucial because successful reconciliation is
the best guarantee against the resurrection and reemergence of conflict and
violence. The third priority should be to focus on the roles and functions of
the new media. This effort is especially challenging because of the constant
and rapid developments in communication technology. Research in this field
must resemble research in computer science. It has to be fast, dynamic, and
highly sensitive lest published research results become obsolete. The fourth
priority should be given to LIC. Existing research tends to concentrate on
HIC. Although HIC is more attractive to scholars because it is more dramatic
and spectacular, most existing and future conflicts are or will be LIC.
Given the lack of cooperation between scholars in the different relevant
fields and between scholars and practitioners, and given the multitude of
divergent concepts and approaches to media roles, it is crucial to integrate and
apply theories and models from both communication and conflict studies. It
is also useful to integrate the theories and the models into comprehensive
multidisciplinary frameworks for analysis. This is the most promising way to
move forward. The framework presented here could be a first step toward a
new, integrated, multidimensional, and multidisciplinary research effort.

